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Joshua H. Snoke 
Robert M. Perito draws on a wealth of experience as the director of the Security Sector 
Governance Center of Innovation at the US Institute of Peace, serving as a Foreign Area 
Officer for the Department of State as well as the Deputy Executive Secretary of the 
National Security Council. He has authored at least two other books on the subject of 
building stable police and governmental forces in today’s environment of instability. 
This one, Where is the Lone Ranger?, focuses primarily on lessons learned during 
military nation-building and contingency operations. 
Perito’s main argument is that the United States needs to learn from our previous 
engagements and establish a true federalized constabulary force under the Department 
of Defense. In today’s environment, the international community, and by default the 
United States, needs to train, maintain and equip this constabulary force. It must be 
capable of filling the gap between the initial blunt force of military action to establish 
overall security, and rebuilding the local national police force of a failed-state. As Perito 
aptly points out, in such a scenario, local law enforcement often become part of the 
problem, either becoming trained insurgents or simply being ineffective in suppressing 
a large indigenous resistance greater than the modest criminal activities they are trained 
to combat. 
As someone who has deployed all over the world, including in some of the operations 
Perito uses as his case studies, I concur with Army Lieutenant General James Dubik’s 
assessment that sending in “too light a footprint is as unhelpful as one that is too 
heavy.” The military must follow established the Rules of Engagement (ROE) designed 
to ensure the safety of civilians caught in a war zone. But these same rules tie our hands 
as insurgents know and use them against us. Perito claims that the military is ill-
equipped to handle angry yet “unarmed” mobs, with women and children present. As an 
Embedded Training Team Leader in Afghanistan, working for NATO Combined 
Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, I led Afghan National Army and Police 
throughout the country, including Operation Moshtarak in Helmand Province. 
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Personally experiencing several of these missions and mob scenes, I concur that we are 
ill-equipped for constabulary aspects of the mission. Although these people often have 
pipes, rocks, glass and things set ablaze as weapons, they are deemed “unarmed” as they 
are without firearms. This creates a dangerous situation as military forces assigned to 
maintain peace and stability have firearms, but are not permitted to use this level of 
force against an unequal force. This imbalance brought by exploiting our measured use 
of proportionality often leads to unwelcome circumstances for the US and other NATO 
forces. 
This book brings to light the need for such a constabulary force, and explains how and 
why it is necessary, as we will inevitably continue to operate in such environments that 
need police and military functions simultaneously in order to maintain security while 
rebuilding the rule of law. 
Perito uses several case studies as examples of how a gap in security must be filled by 
the presence of a well-trained constabulary force. From Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late 
1990s to the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan, each presented unique landscapes, 
cultures, and security threats. Yet, the argument holds up for all of these situations. 
Having a reliable police force to maintain order of civilian threats, as well as train and 
place trustworthy local police forces, is invaluable to operations of nation-building and 
restoration. 
Perito covers all the aspects of his argument in a well-balanced fashion. He does this not 
only via historical US forces, such as the Texas Rangers, but also by citing European 
constabulary forces, such as the Spanish Guardia Civil, that have a traditional 
background in both local police functions and military operations. He begins with the 
case study of NATO Stability Forces in Bkro, from a fresh, almost first-person 
perspective. 
His approach is as factual as a textbook, littered with source references, but written in a 
way that keeps the reader interested, looking for the next piece. Even if you have no 
previous background knowledge of his case studies, Perito eventually comes back 
around to ensure you understand his jargon. He mentions acronyms that many may not 
be familiar with, such as SFOR and OHR in the Bkro case, but then explains that they 
are NATO Stability Forces sent in to secure the area while the Office of the High 
Representative took an advisory role for civilian affairs and Non-Governmental 
Agencies. Perito uses several different articles written by reputable news media outlets 
during the times of the case studies as sources. Additionally, he uses interviews from 
actual people involved in these operations, providing legitimacy to his writing, as well 
as giving the men on the ground the opportunity to offer vital perspective from their 
own eyes. This is invaluable to people who want to know not only the large scale 
strategic viewpoint of an argument, but also the ground truth. Perito also uses peer 
reviewed writings to back his theory, which lends credibility to his argument and makes 
it a book useful for college students to cite. 
My only wish is that he would have used more enlisted sources for Iraq and Afghanistan 
in order to see the point of view of the front line warfighter. The perspective of a 
Commanding General, like General Caldwell or McChrystal, would have been excellent 
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for strategic insights But their perception may not be the same as the convoy leader who 
took his people into the villages daily. A truly well balanced approach requires both 
perspectives. 
From my own perspective being embedded with the Afghan National Security Forces, I 
saw that our problem was not so much lack of funding, but in the misuse of funds by 
corrupt Afghan generals. These men were taking ghost pay from soldiers who had 
enlisted and then abandoned their position to go back to harvest poppies or be with 
family. Additionally, the entire process was overwhelmed, as soldiers like 
communications officers were indiscriminately thrust into contracting officer billets 
from a lack of any financial officers in the area creating an unacceptable vacuum. This 
lack of training or knowledge, coupled with only a six month turnover, often caused 
situations to slip through the budget that could have otherwise been avoided. By the 
time someone learned the processes of how to ensure US money was properly funneled 
to worthy Afghan sources, it was time for them to rotate home and the burden fell on 
the shoulders of a new untrained contracting officer. 
Overall, Perito’s argument makes sense and is quite persuasive. My one reservation is 
that in America today, such a force would be hard for the American public to 
comprehend as it would be seen as Big Brother enforcing Martial Law. People would 
see this as another step toward a New World Order, in which an international police 
force could come in to a country and enforce a law that was not native to the territory. 
For this force to work there needs to be major oversight with rules emplaced to ensure 
the objective is balanced, safeguarding the rights of citizens. Even during the Dayton 
Accord negotiations, there was hesitation from many allies fearing these forces being 
viewed as, or turning into an “occupation regime.” 
In fact, as Perito astutely points out, the US has actually used nation-building 
constabulary police forces in the past on foreign soil. The US went in to many countries 
in Latin America to help establish the peace and continuity of governmental rule of law. 
Unfortunately, the fears of those during the Dayton Accord were based in history and, 
“in every case except Cuba, the indigenous constabularies evolved into antidemocratic 
armies, providing a vehicle for local dictators to gain power.” 
These aren’t the only problems, as even Perito admits. In Japan after WWII, it led to a 
terrible situation during the Korean War, as non-combat proven soldiers doing police 
and administration functions in Japan were sent to fight in Korea as the closest forces. 
This led the US military to say, “‘never again’ would US military forces be converted to 
other purposes that would result in their losing their ‘readiness’ and combat 
effectiveness.” 
There would have to be an obvious capstone in place to ensure history does not repeat 
itself. I agree with his idea of using Military Police as a starting point for such a 
constabulary force as MPs are already trained both in military and police functions. In 
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Afghanistan, they were not in a constabulary role, but were often very helpful, within 
the restrictions of the aforementioned ROE. 
Anyone desiring background knowledge of how constabulary forces work and how they 
have been used in the past should read this book. Although I knew from experience 
there was a security gap presented in nation-building operations, especially within 
constricted NATO and US ROE, I had never drawn the conclusion or connected the 
dots myself that our brothers in combat, such as the Gendarmerie or Carabinieri, could 
more effectively be used in such a deployable constabulary force if trained and 
mobilized correctly. I can’t stress enough the value of this book to any college student, 
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